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Future Past:
The Gay Science, Thus Spoke Zarathustra and Eternity*
Or
What is the Weight of the Greatest Heavy Weight?
Babette Babich

If you believed more in life, you would devote yourselves
less to the moment. Z I: Of the Preachers of Death

The first version of The Gay Science was published in 1882 and the aphorism that concludes this
book also serves for Nietzsche as incipit for his next book: Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for
All and None. This essay looks at the notion of eternal recurrence, which Nietzsche also happens
to introduce at the end of Book Four of The Gay Science, and is thus addressed to the intimate
connection between The Gay Science and Thus Spoke Zarathustra, two books, both of which
were published in unfinished versions. In fact, Thus Spoke Zarathustra was published in several
unfinished versions.1 To be precise, Nietzsche publishes the individual books of Thus Spoke
Zarathustra, seriatim: beginning with the first book in 1883: Also Sprach Zarathustra, Ein Buch
für Alle und Keinen, which appeared with E. Schmeitzner in Chemnitz and then a little later that
same year of 1883, publishing the second part: Also Sprach Zarathustra, Ein Buch für Alle und
Keinen, 2.
*
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Karl Schlechta’s Nietzsche-Chronik reports that “Zarathustra I was written out in ten days in
January,”2 giving us an ontic calendar-month illumination of the Sanctus Januarius metaphor of
a “flaming spear” and “highest hope and goal” which Nietzsche foreground in his epigraph to
Book Four of The Gay Science, located and dated, Genoa, January 1882. Januaries were
manifestly good months for Nietzsche’s productivity as he himself noted.
Nietzsche published the third book and officially (in terms of public publication) the last
book of Zarathustra in 1884, again appearing with same publisher under the likewise duly
numbered title: Also Sprach Zarathustra, Ein Buch für Alle und Keinen, 3. Notoriously,
Nietzsche restricted the circulation of the fourth and parodic book to a ‘limited’ edition — i.e.,
for ‘friends only’ — printed in 1885. Thereafter he would attempt to reacquire all of the extant
copies, which is a bit like hitting send after writing an email and wishing that one might later
unsend or undo the message. That Nietzsche meant to “unsend” or repress the fourth book is
clear because in 1886 he published the first three books as Also Sprach Zarathustra, but left out
the fourth. That this exclusion was deliberate is also plain given the listing of the author’s ‘other
published works’ featured on the back-cover of Beyond Good and Evil. There Nietzsche
emphasizes that ‘the fourth and last part of the just mentioned work from the start of the year
1885, was not as yet to be made available to booksellers.”3
Of course, we Nietzsche scholars could seemingly care less about this and nearly everyone
writes as if there were indeed four books to the Zarathustra cycle rather than three (an issue
complicated though I will not discuss this here by Nietzsche’s characterization of his Zarathustra
as music and the form or parts of the piece, as — either — sonata or symphony).
There has been a great deal written about Nietzsche’s writing of Thus Spoke Zarathustra,
including what one author calls his aesthetic calculus,4 but also about the meaning of the book
and its metaphors, explications of its style, its origins whether based as a small percentage argue
on Wagner, or as is maintained by the majority of scholars, based on the gospels, whereby
Nietzsche presents the prophet Zarathustra contra the evangelist, on the model of the new
testament convention as Nietzsche also expresses this conventionality to conclude his ultimate
author’s catalogue of his own books (as of his own life) on the last page of Ecce Homo —
“Dionysus against the crucified.”
For my part, I am going to update these older accounts in the contemporary context by
situating Nietzsche’s Zarathustra among the genre of parody, particularly of the parabolic sort. I
argue that Nietzsche draws on Lucian, the 2nd century AD author because I find echoes of this
satirical author throughout, backwards and forwards, but especially given the ‘true stories’ or
‘serious’ or ‘earnest lies’5 characteristic of Lucian, the stylistic genius and satirist of antiquity,
both Roman and Greek, both Jew and Christian, including all schools of philosophy and so on.
Everyone notes that Lucian was an outstanding stylist and so quite the writer. But for me
what is decisive is that Lucian happened to have been Diogenes Laertius’ contemporary and as
we know, Diogenes Laertius wrote, a tad less flashily, on the same themes that occupy Lucian in
his dialogues, writing on all the philosophers, especially Empedocles, as well as topics Roman
and Greek, Jew and Christian.
For me this is the most relevant detail as Nietzsche specialized in Diogenes Laertius6 — and
that Diogenes Laertius would almost certainly have been the topic of his doctoral dissertation,
had Nietzsche submitted one (as he did not in fact although he wrote extensively in preparation
for such a text. And as we all know, a philologist, a Graecist, especially one of Nietzsche’s
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formation (and especially under Ritschl, especially one whose friend Erwin Rohde specialist
emphases included Lucian from the start), for anyone who wrote on either Lucian or Diogenes
Laertius could not dispense with the other.
I’ve written several essays now on Lucian and Nietzsche,7 but I believe that you can only
take the point not if I say so, and especially not if you take my word for it, but, and this is also in
Zarathustra’s spirit as it is also the point of exigent or rigorous philology and philosophy of the
continental kind, only if you yourself go and read Lucian for yourself. If you do you may
recognize many of Nietzsche’s reflections in The Gay Science, especially those on truth and lie
and including his reflections “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense” are Lucianic and have
less to do with Plato than many of us suppose, especially those influenced overmuch (but that
would be all of us, as Whitehead tells us) or directly by Plato, or indirectly, but even more
powerfully by Leo Strauss.
Writing in Zarathustra, “the poets lie too much,” (Z II, Of Poets) Nietzsche is quotes Lucian,
the same Lucian whose ‘true story,’ his alethe diegammata, a tall tale about being caught in the
belly of a whale and travelling beyond the pale, to the island of fantastic delights.8 The same
section, “Of Poets,” follows “Of Scholars” in Thus Spoke Zarathustra and invokes Lucian’s
“betwixt heaven and earth of which only the poets have let themselves dream.” Of course, and
literary scholars have made this point before me, it is Lucian’s language that inspires
Shakespeare. And Zarathustra reflects rather more of Lucian’s satirical critical dream than
Hamlet’s metaphysical musings especially where he goes on to say: “and especially above
heaven: for all gods are poets’ images, poet’s surreptitiousness!” The reference is, as many
references are, overdetermined, and we are “drawn upward” as Nietzsche says, wafted like the
hero of Lucian’s Icaromenippus (the first science fiction story so we pretend, because it involves
an extraterrestrial flight,9 wherein Menippus the storied inventor of the satire that carried his
name,10 tells a friend of his voyages in the heavens, outfitted with mismatched wings (echoes of
Plato’s soul), taken from two different giant raptors (“taking a good large eagle and also a strong
vulture and cutting off their wings, joints and all”).11 This fantastic story would already be a
quite a lot, if this were all, as we read Zarathustra saying that “we set our motley puppets on the
clouds and then call them gods and overhumans.” (Z II, On Poets)
As we know, though some scholars prefer to discover this source in Goethe or New
Testament and Patristic sources, the original source for Nietzsche’s language (not to mention the
constellation of the first appearance in Zarathustra) of the so-named Übermensch, given
Nietzsche’s own expert specialization in the second century BCE Diogenes Laertius, is the
similarly second century Lucian, but if we go on to read Lucian’s tall tale or ‘true story’ we find
additional resonances with Zarathustra especially detailing boat voyages and adventures to
strange lands inspiring Jonathan Swift among others but in the same locus in Lucian we also
meet Rhadamanthus and the souls of the departed, and a miraculous description of the Isles of
the Blest.12 Reading further in Zarathustra’s Of the Poets, we are find offering drawn from what
can seem to be catalog of Lucian’s dialogues including The Dead Come to Life or the
Fisherman13 as well as Lucian’s Philosophies — sometimes rendered as Creeds — for Sale,14
“Ah indeed, I cast my net into their sea and hoped to catch fine fish; but always I drew out an old
god’s head.” (Z II: Of Poets) And as we move to the section in Thus Spoke Zarathustra “Of
Great Events,” set on an island “not far from the Blissful Isles of Zarathustra,” we read that
Zarathustra himself, like Menippus, likewise has taken to the air, flying not above the clouds, but
downward, as in Lucian’s Downward Journey, which dialogue is, of course, where we read
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about the overman, the hyperanthropos or the tyrant.15 Or the tyrant is the subtitle of the
dialogue and the tyrant is the kind of man who ought to be, and who inevitably will be,
overcome. We all go down to the dark.
Earnest liars, as both Nietzsche and Lucian may be described as being,16 they are also, like
Aristotle, better or greater friends to the truth (preserved by inversion) than they are to Plato.
Thus one can compare the advantage given Hesiod over Homer in Nietzsche’s discussion of the
same (a lie, but a serious lie — shades of the fourth century AD sophist and historiographer,
Eunapius’s epithet for Lucian himself, that is: a good lie, a white lie: one that preserves peace
rather than promoting the cause of war). Thus Lucian observes: “on reading all these authors, I
did not find much fault with them for their lying, as I saw that this was already a common
practice even among men who profess philosophy”17 where these other authors present their lies
as truths his own lying would have to be accounted as “more honest than theirs, for although I
tell the truth in nothing else, I shall at least be truthful in saying that I am a liar.”18
In the same way, Erasmus and Thomas More would read Lucian, as would Hume who made
it a point to read Lucian’s dialogues of the dead, particularly the dialogue that offered Nietzsche
the source for his term Overhuman, hyperanthropos, as we have already noted Lucian’s dialogue
Kataplous, variously translated as The Downward Journey, that is indeed the Journey into Port,
the port in question being Charon’s home port. As Nietzsche writes “The beauty of the
Übermensch came to me as a shadow.” (Z II, On the Blissful Islands) For Lucian as indeed for
all Greeks, the underworld is the world of shades and all of us as mortal are companions, one
with another, on that downward journey. In this sense, the overman is the man on the surface, the
same surface upon which we find ourselves, here and now. But if all these philosophers from
Erasmus to Hume to Nietzsche were reading Lucian, if Jonathan Swift was reading Lucian (his
Tale of a Tub echoes this as does his Battle of the Books not to mention his Gulliver), the only
philosophers not reading Lucian would be most philosophers today.
With these and other even more recondite distinctions in mind, I mean to begin (I can hardly
finish here) to compare both The Gay Science and Thus Spoke Zarathustra as initially or first
published as avowedly incomplete (which incompleteness is perhaps the most Lucianic joke, if
we needed another one, of all: Lucian promises to finish his tale of his adventures at the
conclusion of his True Story, but, of course, never does). And, to be sure, the final book of The
Gay Science, ‘We Fearless Ones,’ foregrounds the question of parts and wholes in what
Nietzsche regarded (in a musical context) as the art of endings. Endings matter for Nietzsche as a
writer (and of course as a composer, failed or not) because the end of the fourth book of The Gay
Science, features a demon, that favorite philosopher’s familiar now adding Nietzsche’s version to
that of Socrates’ negative or cautionary daimon to Descartes’ evil genius, a strange demon who
predicts or foretells a future that includes no new news, as it were. This future is nothing but the
past again, one’s own past repeated — no chance for a new age discovery of having been
Cleopatra or even Nietzsche himself in one’s former life, just the same old, same old with
everything great and small in it, repeated, da capo and without alteration, without exception.
What returns is the everyday time of everydayness itself: that is what was, that is the stone fact,
like Mozart’s stone guest, the uncanny insight of the persistence of what has been that would
prove to be so fruitful — es war — for Freud’s theory of the unconscious, where all this
sameness resides, the same: the past untouched by present reality. The future told by Nietzsche’s
demon is a future of the past: neither a cycle of recycled stars or souls (not even an unknown day
laborer as Odysseus — yet another Lucianic hero — elegized in Plato’s dream of the
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underworld) just and only the past one already knows so well that (according to Freud again) one
spends most of one’s waking life and all of one’s dream-time revisiting and transforming it. No
wonder the second book of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra begins with The Child with the Mirror, preDionysus, little Zagreus, who comes to Zarathustra to show him his mirror and to ask him to
look into it, whereupon Zarathustra cries out as he does not recognize himself “but the sneer and
grimace of a devil.” (Z II: The Child with the Mirror) What follows are denunciations — fairly
hard ones (the Nietzsche of The Antichrist proves to be much kinder) — of the redeemer and
those who preach the word of the redeemer, of redemption, of paradise: the future perfected, life
eternal: “You want to be paid as well, you virtuous! Do you want reward for virtue and heaven
for earth and eternity for your today.” (Z II: Of the Virtuous) This is the life of those of whom
Zarathustra can mock — and the often strident, polemical, hammer-precision of Nietzsche is
clearly at stake as he characterizes the virtuous as he already does in The Gay Science but
explicitly so in Beyond Good and Evil and again, in case we missed it, in On the Genealogy of
Morals — “‘We bite nobody and avoid him who wants to bite; and in everything we hold the
opinion that is given us.’” (Z II: Of the Virtuous) This biting, also crucial as a word for parodic,
satirical wit, turns out to be central.
For Nietzsche, this same past focus becomes the concern with the ‘it was’ that he will go on
to express as the musing, brooding pre-occupation with the past that is the ultimate poison of
ressentiment. The focus will be on the teaching of the eternal return expressed as a recurrence of
the past raised to eternity and the challenge of affirming the standing past, like the nunc stans,
throughout all possibilities of what will be.19
The last lines of the first published book of Thus Spoke Zarathustra is a promise, a prayer,
an oath, that expresses the heart of Nietzsche’s teachings of the death of god, the Übermensch or
overhuman, and arguably, the will to power: “‘All gods are dead; now we want the Overhuman
to live’ — let this be our last will one day at the great noontide.” (Z I: Of the Bestowing Virtue,
§3)
What resounds, of course, in the notion of the great noontide is the standing moment of the
cycle of the world year, both Empedocles and Heraclitus. Gadamer emphasizes this in his “The
Great Year of Zarathustra” as I also argue for a parallel for Empedocles and Heraclitus for
Nietzsche, especially with respect to Zarathustra.20
Some scholars overlook the connection perhaps because the eternal return is such a
complex notion. It’s been argued that the Eternal Recurrence doesn’t even appear in the first
book.21 Of course it does but for readers who require a label (one wonders if this is the best
approach with Nietzsche) the reference can be elusive but there it is nonetheless. If I had more
time, I would point out the connection between The Gay Science and Beyond and Evil and all the
other published works as Thus Spoke Zarathustra functions as a cautionary fulcrum intervening
between them.
Here however I am simply noting the focus on the past (and the present) in Nietzsche’s idea
of the future as he speaks of it in terms of eternal recurrence as it is this that links the two texts
under consideration here.
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The Greatest Weight
The teaching Zarathustra comes down from his mountain to teach is not quite the Good News but
and much rather and once again, the eternal return is not just anamnesis, recycling the soul for a
new playing of a new life, expiating karma and all that, like the eternal whirl of the cosmos in all
its complexity, like the spin around our own sun and everything it brings round, again and again,
but — Nietzsche emphasizes this — the same. Das Gleiche.
It is the sameness that I wish to emphasize as it is this that offers the light of eternity and the
love song, the round with which Nietzsche concludes the third book of his The Gay Science. This
sameness makes the demon who comes at the end of the fourth book to tell us that we will not be
ushered into either heaven or hell, the kind of demon only philosophical minds like Descartes or,
responding to Laplace, scientists like Maxwell could dream up. And the reference to science is
important because the mathematician Emile Poincaré offered a wonderfully stochastic proof of
nothing less than the Eternal Return, quite independently of Nietzsche and just given the second
law of thermodynamics together with the assumption that the universe was, for example, closed
or finite. This was the assumption for Nietzsche and for others in his day, and some scientists
still assume it.
The philosophic question however turns on the sameness of the eternal return of the same,
this is also of course echoed in the full presence of eternity which is of course not in time and
thus the beautiful word scene or painting that Nietzsche gives us in Zarathustra’s conversation
with the dwarf in Of the Vision and the Riddle, claiming that the dwarf could not bear the weight
of the thought itself. It is at this moment, that Zarathustra himself is no longer weighted down
with the weight of the dwarf but lightened: the dwarf literally takes a load off, springing to the
ground from Zarathustra’s shoulder where he had been pouring thoughts of lead into his ear (do
not forget leaden type, as you read this: do not forget the dwarves among philologists and
philosophers, and do not forget the obstacles to made by the dead weight of everything they
write). The gateway, Augenblick, has, as Zarathustra goes on to say, two aspects, two colliding,
opposing, aspects: paths along which no one has ever travelled to their end. “The lane behind
us,” Zarathustra says to the dwarf, “an eternity, the long lane ahead of us, another eternity.” (Z,
Vision, 2) And now we are counting with Cantorian dimensions. Zarathustra asks a geometer’s
question, because the point is a matter of mapping the points along the path — tracing the path,
namely supposing that one were to “follow them further and ever further,” he asks, “do you
think, dwarf, that these paths would be in eternal opposition?” (Z, Vision, 2) The thought of the
circle is evident here, but the key to the problem is the problem of the parallel postulate that
shatters Euclidean geometry. And the circular answer is the answer given, disdainfully, if we
remember, by the dwarf “All truth is crooked, time itself is a circle” (Z, Vision, 2)
The question, the riddle Zarathustra riddles the dwarf, is cosmological, the domain of Ernst
Mach’s concern and it was Schrödinger’s field when he taught at the Dublin Institute of
Cosmology.22 This is the riddle of the Timaeus, the riddle of Kant’s antinomy concerning the
eternity of the world.23 Zarathustra repeats the point in his own recounting:
‘Behold this moment,’ I went on, ‘From this gateway Moment a long eternal lane
runs back: an eternity lies behind us.
‘Must not all things that can run have already run along this lane? Must not all
things than can happen have already happened, been done, run past? And if all things
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have been here before: What do you think of this moment, dwarf? Must not this gateway,
too, have been here – before?
And are not all things bound fast together in such a way that the moment draws after
it all future things. Therefore — draws itself too. For all things that can run must run once
again forward along this long lane.” (Z, Vision, §2)

The solution to the riddle of the crossroad of past and future, fore and aft is, the howling
dog, the dog of Hecate,24 Cerberus, and so on, and “stillest midnight, when even dogs believe in
ghosts” and Zarathustra finds himself, as at the end of the fourth book of The Gay Science
“alone, desolate, in the most wild moonlight.” There Zarathustra sees what so agitates the dog, “a
young shepherd, writing, choking, convulsed, his face distorted; and a heavy, black snake was
hanging out of his mouth.” The man Zarathustra wondered had perhaps been asleep and perhaps
thus the snake had “crept into his throat — and there it had bitten itself fast.” The
recommendation that comes to him, — ‘ a voice cried from me — ‘Bite! Bite!’ as nothing else
works to dislodge the snake is the sudden insight that one is not ‘in disgust and pallid horror’ to
be paralyzed or frozen but act against the biting snake: to bite back. This is the riddle, ‘Who is
the shepherd? … who is the man …” But while he asking his venturers and adventurers and
those of you who have embarked with cunning sails unpon undiscovered sees, he also reports the
shepherd’s response who “bit as my cry had advised him; he bit with a good bite! He spat far
away the snake’s head — and sprang up.”
Thereby, so we read, he is transformed, literally transfigured: “surrounded with light,
laughing” a human being like no other Zarathustra had ever seen. I guess the snake’s blood is
magical, or maybe it’s just the magnificent spitting out of the head that does it. But the result is a
other-human laughter “Never yet on earth had a human being laughed as he laughed.” (Z, Vision,
§2)
So far so good, and all of us, know this passage. But how can the thought of “what is
heaviest and blackest” work as Nietzsche says it does and what does it mean to say that one must
bite into it. How would this “thought of thoughts” as Nietzsche’s Zarathustra names it, change
one’s life, assuming we were able to think it to begin with? Like all paradoxes, it is hard to think
as Nietzsche’s Zarathustra also underscores this difficulty — but, still, to ask an easier version of
the same question: why on earth would thinking it, assuming we could think it, change us utterly?
Well — it’s the same.
Indeed, isn’t the point Nietzsche underscores nothing but the exclusion of any change, much
less any utter change, all change, any alteration, big and small, excluded at the outset? Isn’t this
also part of the mathematician’s paradox that Hilary Putnam borrows from Abbot’s Flatland (a
topological insider’s plagiarism none of us would care to fault, so I presume) when Putnam
points out that, and this is just Leibniz’ point regarding a difference that would not (in this case
because it could not) make a difference, that were we all, in fact, so many brains in vats, the very
idea of being one would mean nothing (to us) and would-could not be true (there’s a hermeneutic
rider here, but I am not going to do work Putnam never bothered to do).
The frozen temporal tableau of the ‘Moment’ in Vision and the Riddle reprises the personal
dynamism of a lifetime, as Nietzsche puts the same insight into the mouth of the tightrope walker
better said, tightrope dancer [Seiltanzer], the performing acrobat who falls to his death in the
middle of Zarathustra’s first speech. (Z, Prologue, §6)
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The figure of the tightrope-walker is essential rather than decorative because after the death
of God — as Hegel puts in quite explicitly in the wake of Kant — we are all of us dancing
without a net, suspended in our human, all-too-human lives as Nietzsche puts it: an interval, a
breath, “a hiatus between two nothingnesses.” (KSA 12, 473)
Zarathustra pays no attention at all to the tight rope dancer — he doesn’t see him and the
drama is played out, as if in Plato’s cave, above and behind the speaking Zarathustra.25 And the
dwarf is there too, this time in the guise of an evil hunchback, causing all manner of trouble,
jumping over the tightrope dancer and causing him to lose his footing, crashing to his death in
the marketplace below.
Zarathustra, who goes to the side of the broken performer as he dies, comforts the dying
man by telling him just what follows from the Enlightenment account: “…there is no Devil and
no Hell. Your soul will be dead even before your body; therefore fear nothing anymore!” (Ibid.,
§6), the crushed man is not comforted as he hears the logical and nihilist implications of
naturalist science:
If you are speaking the truth,’ he said, ‘I leave nothing when I leave life. I am not much more
than an animal which has been taught to dance by blows and starvation. (Ibid.)

You, you yourself return but not as you are now, that is, you return but not with everything
you take yourself to be: you as you now suppose (or imagine) yourself to have been and you now
as expect yourself to become.
Rather what returns is exactly what was: and there will be nothing different in it.
The title I have given this discussion of Nietzsche’s teaching of eternal recurrence between
The Gay Science and Thus Spoke Zarathustra is Future Past because what is at stake is the past,
the same as it was and every tiny and every major aspect of it: this is das Gleiche: the same old,
same old.
And the point of it all is death.
If I had longer I would take this reading as suggested above to a discussion of Beyond Good
and Evil inasmuch as the problem of Beyond Good and Evil is nothing other than the problem of
truth, considered as a problem and just as Nietzsche also raised the problem of science viewed in
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the same light and questioned as a problem. Most of us are so keen to emphasize art or life that
we have forgotten that it was Nietzsche’s emphasis to raise the question he pronounced himself
the very first to raise, namely the very radically and in the spirit of the first critique, the very
critically Kantian question of science, as such.26
But I don’t have more time — and part of the point of this essay is that none of us ever do —
so let’s go back to the thought Zarathustra calls his ‘most abysmal thought’ as this echoes the
conversation with the demon in The Gay Science. As noted this is also the thought of death and
The Gay Science has an aphorism titled with the same name, suggesting that the brotherhood of
death that we share as mortal beings is the only brotherhood there is for living subjects of
consciousness, for subjects of desire, for subjects such as ourselves, all of us, born to mortality
and thus bound to die, whether we think about it or not.
Nietzsche’s point is the philosophical point that living subjects abjure the thought of death:
it is the furthest thing from their minds.
For his part, the economically (or dismally) minded Schopenhauer reflected that life was a
business that did not cover its costs, a business that from an economic point of view, a business
point of view, made absolutely no sense “as an enterprise,” and therefore was the only thing that
really compelled reflection. Nietzsche added more biology and more thermodynamic statistics to
the same reflection, recognizing that abundance and waste was the way of life — and of death.
Hence he could argue with the best of 19th century cosmology that a dancing star was born of
chaos, excess, confusion. Not that it mattered given that that dancing star too would have to die.
Elsewhere, in an essay on Schrödinger and Nietzsche and life, I point to the parallels that
may be made if one likes, beyond Nietzsche, to the philosophical problem of consciousness and
personal identity but also with eastern philosophy.27 Thus it matters that here is (and for the
Stoics it was essential to reflect that there could be) no difference between the you that says I and
the universe. You are are already everything and you do not know it, with the one crucial
exception that you can master the trick of thinking this identity, as Nietzsche also mused. To this
extent, we know that we are those who have figured out that we are figures in the dream of a god
who dreams.
Here I begin the final section of this essay, by noting that Nietzsche held that if was perhaps
“inhuman to bless where one was cursed,” (BGE §181) what was by contrast divine he also
called “the humaneness’ of the future,” (GS §337). This was ‘the happiness of a god,’ a
happiness possible for the human being who might indeed learn the ultimate trick divinity, which
is blessing, yes-saying, affirmation: to bless life, to love fate, amor fati. Note that perhaps, and
this is the all-too-human element, one fails to achieve this possibility. Thus one might also fail to
be able to this, being unable to “endure this immense sum of grief of all kinds while yet being the
hero who, as the second day of battle breaks, welcomes the dawn and his fortune, being a person
whose horizon encompasses thousands of years of past and future.” (Ibid.)
In any case, no matter whether one is able to contain or fails to contain in one soul “the
oldest, the neweres, losses, hopes, conquests, and the victories of humanity … and crowd it into
a single feeling,” (ibid.) what remains significant is the long run. This is the highest feeling. This
is eternity. Thus when Nietzsche writes contra the usual role of the promises of the afterlife in an
early unpublished note, he explains the inexorable or factive force of his imperative here: “My
teaching says, Thus to live that you would wish to live again is the task — you will do so in any
case.”28
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In other words you will, in any case, be reborn, again and again. But qua reborn, your
consciousness is no more connected to your consciousness than your consciousness is identical
with the consciousness of drinking this morning’s cup of coffee, assuming you were conscious
enough to remember to have a cup of coffee to begin with. We do not remember our own
present lives, how can we remember our past lives? It is the past that does not change, our
memories do nothing but change.
Thus Nietzsche reflects on pride and memory: “‘I have done that’ says my memory. That I
cannot have done — says my pride and remains inexorable. Finally — memory yields.” (BGE
§68) You are no longer present to the past self that you were, you are not conscious of the past.
Thus Nietzsche’s emphasis is on the same and where do we find this in our experience?
Thus this sameness is the curse that Nietzsche emphasizes in his account of the greatest heavy
weight – das grösste Schwergewicht – in his The Gay Science, as he breaks off the fourth book
which he concludes before going on to write his Trojan Horse, his seductive gift to the masses,
his Thus Spoke Zarathustra, A Book for All and None.
For we all recall that the demon does not come to one in one’s loneliest loneliness to ask one
to consider one’s life in the light of eternity, as the Stoic philosophers might have done, as the
desert fathers would also do.
Much rather the demon foretells a future that is not so much about a further future, this is not
the substance of what the demon emphasizes, but announces a future prospect that is all about
the past as we cannot have done with it. The future is a future of the past, your past, the past you
already happen to know so well that, as already mentioned, Freud insists that you spend most of
your living and dream time revising. Nothing like a repetition compulsion. Nor do we fail to
retell ourselves to ourselves such that on the story we tell ourselves the wretched things we have
done can all of them be laid to someone’s else’s account, some other cause, god, what have you.
This is the “dangerous perhaps” (BGE §2), this is why we baptize our convictions, our prejudices
as fact or as ‘truths’ (BGE §5), and it is the reason Nietzsche suggests that “every great
philosophy has hitherto been: a confession on the part of its author and kind of involuntary and
unconscious memoir.” (BGE §6) Ultimately this is also why Nietzsche proposes in place of the
antinomies so many “questions of conscience for the intellect, namely, ‘Whence do I take the
concept thinking? Why do I believe in cause and effect? What gives me the right to speak of an
“I,” and even of an “I” as cause of thought’” (BGE §16)
Da Capo: Once More with Woody Allen
For Nietzsche in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, our focus on the past explains the reference to the
concern with the stone fact, the ‘it was,’ the musing, brooding preoccupation on the past that is
the poison of ressentiment. Let’s spell this out a bit further by recalling what Nietzsche’s
aggressive demon says in The Gay Science:
What if some day or night a demon were to steal after you and into your loneliest
loneliness and say to you: “This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to
live once more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but
every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unutterably small or
great in your life will have to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence —
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even this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this moment and I
myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and again, and
you with it, speck of dust!” (GS §341).

The emphasis here, the eternity here, focuses on the past, indeed a past elevated to an
eternity of the past and not merely the generic idea of the past per se. Living life once, that was
bad enough, we might say, living it eternally (and this is worse than infinity: “once more and
innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it”), is far, far worse: “every pain and
every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unutterably small or great in your life will
have to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence.” (Ibid.)
Yuck.
The past Nietzsche’s demon foretells reliving again and again is not Woody Allen’s
phantom vision of sitting infinitely bored through an infinite number of seatings at the Ice
Capades, this is not a video replay of Groundhog Day, again and again — as one attempts to
shatter the monotony of the same, déjà vu — but and only the self-same. Not the similar, not the
rather like and already seen done drudgery of the been there, lived through that ennui of modern
life as we live it, bored as we live our days, but and again but rather: “This life as you now live it
and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and there will be
nothing new in it…” (Ibid.)
This demon does not say as we read in Revelations, “Behold, I make all things new.”
Nietzsche’s emphasis on life, and the revenge that we mean to take on life, is an emphasis
on created things, “what can be shaken” (Hebrews 12:27) It is an emphasis on all the things we
condemn as philosophers as he writes in Twilight, “Death, change, old age, as well as procreation
and growth, are to their minds objections —refutations even.”
Thus Nietzsche’s call to us is to love what becomes, what changes, including old age and
death, because if one can say yes to one thing, anything at all, everything else is also necessary
and nothing can be dispensed with: everything must be blessed. Nietzsche shares this insight
with the ancient Stoics and with Heraclitus and with Empedocles and indeed Anaximander.

Like a speck of dust, as the demon says, the hourglass of existence is turned upside down,
again and again. That is to say, so Nietzsche argues at the end of his 19th century, and we may
think of this as an harmonic oscillator, the universe is so cycled.
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So Schrödinger argues the point in his argument for eternal recurrence and in another essay I
compare his argument to Nietzsche’s argument. But Schrödinger, interested as he is in the
presocratic philosophers is not echoing Nietzsche but Schopenhauer and the cycling in question
is already a very old story, dating back before the tragic age of the Greeks: it is Empedoclean, it
is Heraclitean, it is also Anaximandrean and Parmenidean but it is perhaps especially known to
us today as a Vedic notion, also resonant in Buddhism. This is the Atman and as Nietzsche says
— more modern than any of us, making the same point Neils Bohr makes about his horse shoes
and about superstition in the realm of the Real29 — shaking his head: du wirst es jedenfalls. This
is you in any case. Tat tvam asi.
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